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| Relativism:
For and Against
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Dee Speaking
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 Our
tentative definition of ethical relativism says that more than one
conflicting moral judgment can be true. But how
do we know that it even makes sense to speak of correct or incorrect,
true or false, moral judgments? This is the kind of question that
20th-century analytical moral philosophers have wondered about.
In part the answer turns on our analysis of the meaning of ethical terms like
'good.' Let
me give you some examples:
- If we accept the emotivist theory popular in the 1940s and
1950s, then "X is good" means roughly "I approve of X.
Do so as well." But if we accept that definition, moral
judgments are neither true nor false. They express (but do not
describe) the attitudes
of the speaker and influence the attitudes of the listener.
Relativism as we have defined it makes no sense at all in this
case because moral judgments are neither true nor
false.
- If we accept a utilitarian definition of good then "X is
good" means roughly that "X will maximize the happiness
or welfare of sentient beings." But if that's our definition
of good, relativism is clearly false. For usually there will be
only one action or type of action that will maximize happiness or welfare.
- Another analysis defines "X is good" in terms of the
attitudes and feelings of the speaker. "X is good" means
that the speaker has certain feelings about X. To say that X is
good describes the attitudes or feelings of the speaker. In this
case all ethical judgments become relative to the speaker. Many philosophers
call this subjectivism, and most agree that it has serious
problems.
- If we take the view that "X is good" means "X is
considered good by the dominant moral code in a culture or
subculture" or "X is considered good by the majority in
some group" then one form of relativism is true. But
there are very serious objections to either of these definitions
of 'good.'
I'm not sure how to proceed here. This is confusing me.
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