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The emotive theory of ethics achieved its greatest popularity among philosophers in the 1930s and 1940s. It was presented in brief form in A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic, published in 1936. A more elaborate and subtle form of the theory was developed by C. L. Stevenson in a series of articles and in his book Ethics and Language (1944). The theory has often been criticized and is no longer held in any of its early forms by a significant number of moral philosophers. Here are some examples of the many criticisms that have been offered.

• According to the emotive theory, ethical judgments are neither true nor false because they are not the sort of thing that can be meaningfully said to be true or false. An expression like "Wow!" or a command like "Close the door" is not the sort of statement that can be true or false. 

  But in everyday conversation we frequently refer to such judgments as true or false. On the face of it, then, the emotive theory flies in the face of everyday moral experience and expression.

• In some versions, the emotive theory tells us that judgments like "John was wrong to kill Fred" expresses our feelings, emotions, or attitudes toward John killing Fred. But in fact we may make this judgment in the absence of any particular feeling, emotion, or attitude about John killing Fred. We may even be glad that John killed Fred and still sincerely say that it was wrong for him to do so.
• Richard Brandt has suggested that Stevenson's analysis of "X is good" as "I approve of X. Do so as well" does not cover all the cases in ordinary conversation in which we used the moral term 'good.' For example, in conditional sentences this analysis seems to fail. We may say that "If it is good or right to do such-in-such, then this or that follows." This use of the terms 'good' and 'right' does not seem to express the speaker's attitudes. (See Brandt's article on the emotive theory in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy.)
• R. M. Hare has suggested that the emotive theory does not allow enough room for reasoned argument in ethics. (See his article on ethics in the Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy & Philosophers.)
• Phillippa Foot has criticized the notion, which seems to be part of the emotive theory, that someone can approve of just anything as morally good. It seems that according to the emotive theory there is a gap between the facts of the case and the approval of the speaker. The facts may be of any sort and the speaker may approve or disapprove. She holds that this is a logical mistake. Moral approval can only be conferred in cases where human well-being are at issue. (See her article "Moral Beliefs" in her anthology Theories of Ethics.