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| Replies |
 Sidgwick (main path) |
 Source Document |
| Relativism: For and Against |
| Fred
Speaking
|
 I
can see why we can't talk about more than one conflicting moral
judgment being true if we take the emotivist definition of a term like
'good.' If we use that definition, moral judgments are never true or
false.
But what I don't understand is this: If we define terms like 'good' and 'right' in such a way that moral judgments containing these terms can be true or false, how can we accept a meta-ethical theory that allows the same judgment to be true and false at the same time for different people or groups? That seems inconsistent. But isn't that what ethical relativism (as we have defined it) requires us to do? Suppose we had a theory in chemistry that allowed us to say that statement P is true for group A and statement P is false for group B. Wouldn't we reject a theory like that? But that seems to be what ethical relativism is saying. |
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