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 Let me
summarize part of what you have been saying.
There are basic differences between what Dee,
John, Ann, and Asheya are saying. All four are
willing to admit that there is a justification
for some sort of property rights in the state of
nature and in political society. But there are
differences.
- Dee believes that people in the state of
nature can acquire strong property rights
by occupying land and perhaps performing
other actions. The justification for these
rights does not commit the owners to any
new moral obligations to others who do not
have property. Furthermore, these natural
property rights carry over into political
society.
- John sees property rights in the state
of nature as much more limited than Dee.
Those who take ownership of natural
resources owe something to the others to
compensate for their loss of access to and
use of those resources. In other words,
exclusive property comes with serious
moral obligations. Those
who do not occupy land, for example,
always retain a right to use the land or
a right to compensation for their loss
of access.
- I think it's fair to say that John tends
toward the view that outside the state of
nature (i.e., in society with government)
property is the creation of legitimate
government or legitimate law. Dee, on the
other hand, believes that the function of
government is not to create property
rights but to protect property rights like
those that can develop in the state of
nature.
- Ayesha has relied on Catholic social
thought and has introduced the concepts of
stewardship and the common good. In her
view, private property is best thought of
as stewardship and comes with built-in
obligations to the common good. Again,
those obligations are part of its basic
justification. She also introduced us to
the left-libertarianism of Peter
Vallentyne, who argues that strong
property rights in natural resources
necessarily involves some sort of
compensation to non-owners.
- Ann has made a utilitarian argument for
property rights. I think that she would
allow that utilitarian arguments could be
made for some sort of property in the
state of nature. But her main point is
that property rights depend on their
consequences for human welfare. With
changing conditions (and therefore, with
changing consequences) property rights can
and should be changed.
I think these points and some of the distinctions
they make are going to show up again in somewhat
different forms. They may turn
out to be important for American politics and
our views on the nature of government.
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