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| Property Rights |
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John Speaking
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I want to
introduce a question that I don't think Dee has
dealt with in her arguments for strong property
rights.
In his Second Treatise of Government,
the English philosopher John Locke began with
the assumption that God gave the earth to people
in common. It was therefore necessary to justify
turning natural resources into some sort of
private property (although not necessarily the
sort that libertarians advocate). Locke claimed
that people could justifiably do this because
each person had property in his own person.
(Dee said something like this when she mentioned
self-ownership.) When someone removed something
from the state of nature, he mixed his labor
with it, and it became his -- "at least where
there is enough, and as good left in common for
others." This last qualification is sometimes
called the Lockean proviso.
Even if we grant everything else in Dee's
argument (and I'm not sure I would), we still
have to ask whether and when the proviso ceased
to be satisfied. Is it satisfied today? In our
society all the land and natural resources are
already owned. What does that mean for the
proviso?
If
the proviso cannot be satisfied today -- or if
it has not been satisfied for a long time --
then what becomes of the strong libertarian
property rights that Dee advocates?
I claim that some sort of
compensation was owed to people once the
proviso was no longer satisfied.
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