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Let me add something else. I said
I think this sort of distinction is going to
show up in other forms. Here's an example:
When we talk about the free
market we can ask if people should have a
strong right to whatever income they can sell
their products or skills for on that market. I
don't want to get ahead of the conversation,
but I think that Dee will tell us that they do
have such a right if there is no force or
fraud involved in the transaction. John and
others will agree to those conditions, but
they will want more. Rawls, for example,
insisted that certain background conditions be
met in order for such market transactions to be just.
I suspect that John will also suggest that
some conditions beyond the absence of force
and fraud be met.
My point is that Dee's
libertarian views on property will carry with
them fewer moral obligations to others than
John's views. The question will arise
over and over -- What do people with strong
property rights to important kinds of property
owe to others who have little or no such
property? On a libertarian view the obligations are
very modest. On a social democratic view, they
are more considerable.
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