Maybe
'treat equal cases equally' is formal rather than substantive, as you
say.
What else can we say about the kind of statement this is?
Philosophers speak of some statements as analytic. On one
interpretation, this means they are true by virtue of the meanings of
the terms involved. 'All bachelors are unmarried' is analytic in this
sense.
Is 'treat equal cases equally' analytic? It doesn't
seem that way to me. If someone said we should treat equal cases quite
differently we might think he was being unjust, but I don't think
anyone would say that his statement was self-contradictory.
But here's another possibility. I believe that some philosophers
have suggested that 'treat equal cases equally' is in some way a requirement of reason.
Consider this argument:
- To make a commitment to acting reasonably is to commit
to offering reasons for our decisions and actions.
Arbitrary decisions and actions are ruled out.
- Therefore, if we commit to acting reasonably, we must be
able to offer a reason for treating one case different
from another.
- If cases are known to be equal in all relevant respects,
there is, by definition, no relevant difference that can
be cited as a reason for treating them differently.
- Therefore, if we are to act reasonably, we must treat
equal cases equally.
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So even though treating equal cases isn't an analytical truth, it may
in this way be an intrinsic part of acting reasonably.
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