There
seems to be something intrinsic to justice that requires just the sort
of commitment you have mentioned -- a commitment to providing reasons
for our actions and decisions.
The philosopher R. M. Hare once made an interesting argument.
Suppose we had two copies of a painting or a photograph. They are the
same except that one is signed and the other is not. What would we
think if someone said "This one is beautiful, but the other is
ugly." Wouldn't there be something logically wrong here? Doesn't
talking about things being beautiful involve a commitment to being
able to find reasons for our judgments? And if there are no relevant
difference between objects, there cannot be any reason to judge them
differently.
Is it the same with justice? Suppose someone said "Yes, the
case of Tom and the case of Joe are alike in all relevant respects,
but I think Tom should be executed and Joe should be let go. Would it
involve the same sort of logical contradiction we find in the case of
the two paintings?
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