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Here's something more important. It goes back to one of John's questions. Why should we pay attention to what is decided in the Original Position? What difference does it make?

The 'contract' (maybe we should just call it a choice?) made in the Original Position is hypothetical. Rawls is not suggesting that it ever took place. But ordinarily people are not bound by hypothetical contracts. Ronald Dworkin makes this point in a discussion of Rawls, and I think we will all agree.

Dworkin offers the following situation for us to think about. Suppose on Monday I did not know the value of a painting I own and would have sold it to you for $100. On Tuesday I discover that it is worth $1,000. What would be the point of you telling me that on Monday I would have sold it to you for $100? The fact is there was no contract on Monday. The fact that I would have agreed to a contract has no bearing on my obligations today because the agreement never took place.

Now suppose that Rawls is correct that parties in the Original Position would agree to his principles of justice. So what? There was no contract and a non-existing contract is non-binding. I am here today with the knowledge I have, and what I would have agreed to in some other situation has no obvious importance.

Dworkin concludes that there must be some other reason for us to be bound by what the parties in the Original Position would have decided. I think he's right.

Now for me, ethics has a theological basis, so the importance of a hypothetical contract is especially problemmatic. But setting that aside, we all need to ask why we should care about a hypothetical contract like the one described by Rawls?