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I find this part of Rawls' theory very interesting. As near as I can tell, he doesn't believe that some of the traditional 'foundations' for justice are available. He doesn't say anything about theological foundations and he explicitly rejects the idea that substantive principles of justice can be derived from the analysis of ethical concepts. At one point, for example, he says the following:

Some philosophers have thought that ethical first principles should be independent of all contingent assumptions, that they should take for granted no truths except those of logic and others that follow from these by an analysis of concepts. Moral conceptions should hold for all possible worlds. Now this view makes moral philosophy the study of the ethics of creation: an examination of the reflections an omnipotent deity might entertain in determining which is the best of all possible worlds. Even the general facts of nature are to be chosen. Certainly we have a natural religious interest in the ethics of creation. But it would appear to outrun human comprehension. [Theory, section #26]

The old arguments that would put the foundations of justice entirely outside human decisions and emotions are gone. Justice for Rawls is a human creation.

Up to this point, I agree with Rawls. But when he goes on to talk about a hypothetical contract, I'm not so sure.