Let
me try to keep us on track here.
As our starting point, we are assuming that ethical relativism is a correct meta-ethical
theory. That means that it may sometimes be the case that there are
two conflicting moral judgments that are both true.
Let us also assume that certain kinds of proof are simply not
available for ethical principles. More specifically, let us assume the
following:
- There is no scientific proof of ethical principles.
- There is no metaphysical proof of ethical principles. In other
words, moral evaluations of good or right are not built into the
fundamental features of reality and ethical principles cannot be
discovered in or derived from such features.
- Ethical principles cannot be derived from moral concepts by
conceptual analysis.
- There is no theological proof or ground for ethical principles.
I think this is what the typical relativist believes to be the
case.
Our question is whether we can speak of ethical or moral knowledge in
this situation? And if not, then what? Does that mean that "anything
goes?"