I'm not so sure, Ayesha.
I agree that tolerance is often a good thing, but I'm not sure that
that is the question here.
I think we are asking whether a moral rule requiring tolerance of
other values and ways of life logically follows from the meta-theory
of ethical
relativism. I don't think it does. Let me approach this two different
ways:
- First, we all agree that there is a lot of moral diversity in
the world. But this is just a statement of fact. There is no way
to derive a moral rule like "We should be tolerant of diverse
moral values" or "We should not interfere with other
cultures" from a simple anthropological fact.
- Second, let's focus on the "equal validity" or
"equal truth" of some contradictory judgments. This is a
meta-ethical thesis about moral judgments. How are we supposed to
derive a moral judgment like "We should be tolerant of diverse
moral values" or "We should not interfere with other
cultures" from a meta-ethical thesis?
I don't see how we can derive any moral rule from either
the fact of diversity or the meta-ethical thesis about equal validity.
This doesn't apply just to tolerance, it applies to any moral rule.