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In our last dialog we talked about John Rawls and his theory of justice. We saw that he revived the social contract tradition and argued that the rules of justice are those that would be chosen in what he called the Original Position. Now Dee has introduced some of the ideas of Loren Lomasky and Jan Narveson -- two more thinkers who also work within the contractarian tradition. Fred has mentioned David Gauthier, whose 1986 book Morals by Agreement was widely read by philosophers. All of these modern contractarians use concepts and arguments from recently developed game theory and decision theory.

Fred has made the point that contractarianism is very attractive to many philosophers because it seems to be able to solve the problem of providing some kind of solid foundations for ethics. Where logic, conceptual analysis, and science fail, contract or agreement seems to be able to provide solid footings. I think he's right on that.

But these writers reach very different conclusions. Rawls was more of a welfare state liberal while Lomasky and Narveson are libertarians. How is that possible?

In part, the difference in conclusions derives from differences in the starting point. Every contractarian starts from an initial situation. Hobbes called it the state of nature. Rawls called it the Original Position, but he conceded that if the initial situation was defined differently, very different principles might be agreed to by the parties in that situation. In other words, what the parties to the contract agree to is in part determined by the definition of the initial situation.

In Rawls's Original Position, he imposed what he called a veil of ignorance. Behind the veil, the parties have no idea of their personal capacities or their social position. Rawls believes that this limitation leads to his own principles. R. M. Hare believed that if the veil were somewhat less thick, the parties would reach utilitarian conclusions. Narveson, Lomasky, and Gauthier dispense with the veil of ignorance. Their initial situations involve people that are fleshed out more fully. They have different capacities and projects and social positions. They are aware of these differences and they will bargain to advance their own interests.

For Rawls, the purpose of the veil was to guarantee impartiality on the part of the parties in the initial situation. For Narveson, Lomasky, and Gauthier the parties are not required to be impartial during the bargaining process, although the rules they agree upon must be applied impartially after the agreement is reached.

In short, one of the most important questions for any contractarian approach is to define the initial situation. And one of the most important tasks of the critic is to scrutinize that definition.