For Rawls, the
contract device is tied to our 'natural
duty of justice'. We have a natural duty
to treat others fairly, for they are
'self-originating sources of valid
claims'. People matter, from the moral
point of view, not because they can harm
or benefit us, but because they are
'ends in themselves'...and so are
entitled to equal consideration....The
contract device helps us determine the
content of this natural duty, for it
requires that each party take into
consideration the needs of others 'as
free and equal beings'. To ensure that
the contract gives equal consideration
to each of the contractors, Rawls's
original position abstracts from
differences in talent and strength that
might create unequal bargaining
power....
Mutual advantage
theorists also use a contract device,
but for opposite reasons. For them,
there are no natural duties or
self-originating moral claims. There is
no moral equality underneath our natural
physical inequality....
So there is
nothing naturally 'right' or 'wrong'
about one's actions, even if they
involve harming others. However, while
there is nothing inherently wrong in
harming you, I would be better off by
refraining from doing so if every other
person refrains from harming me....While
injury is not inherently wrong, each
person gains in the long run by
accepting conventions that define it as
'wrong' and unjust'....
While this
contract, unlike Rawls's, is not an
elaboration of our traditional notions
of moral and political obligation, it
will include some of the constraints
that Rawls and others take to be
'natural duties' -- for example, the
duty not to steal, or the duty to share
the benefits of cooperation fairly
amongst the contributors....
This sort of
theory is aptly described by David
Gauthier, its best-known proponent, as
'moral artifice', for it is an
artificial way of identifying
constraints on what people are naturally
entitled to do. [Will Kymlicka, Contemporary
Political Philosophy, p. 128-9.]