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I think that Rawls' heart is in the right place when he
proposes the difference principle (i.e. that an increase in
inequality is only justified if it benefits the least well off group
in society), but as a utilitarian I'm not sure I can agree with
it.
Let's suppose we have the option to change to a new situation in
which the least advantaged group will be slightly better off while
all the other groups will lose a great deal. We have to assume that
this is the only option we have. This change actually increases
equality and also benefits the least well off group. Does Rawls'
second principle require us to see this change as justified? To me
this seems counterintuitive.
Or consider this example suggested by the philosopher John
Hospers: Imagine a situation in which a new invention will greatly
increase the wealth of a society. Almost everyone will be much
better off, except for a tiny number of people who will be a little
worse off. Does Rawls' principle require us to reject the invention?
Is it so obvious that the change is unjust?
All of this is problemmatical for utilitarians. But it matters
even for non-utilitarians considering Rawls' theory. Rawls believes
that his principles will fit well with our considered moral
judgments. But does preventing lots of people from gaining a lot in
order to keep a few people from losing a little fit our considered
moral judgments? I'm not so sure.
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