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I want to make another point about the two principles. Remember that Rawls claims that the two principles are not equal. The first principle, at least in an affluent society, is prior to the second principle. We can call this the priority of liberty.

H. L. A. Hart has discussed Rawls' views on the priority of liberty at length. We mentioned already that Rawls has two conceptions of justice. On the general conception, liberty can be restricted for other advantages. On the special conception, Rawls claims that liberty can only be restricted for the sake of greater liberty.

Hart does not see how an appeal to "greater liberty" can resolve conflicts between liberties. It appears that other values must be invoked in many cases. But if this is true, then Rawls' claim to the priority of liberty does not fit with our considered judgments about the relative value of liberty and other goods.

In Hart's view, reasonable people will disagree about the relative value of different liberties and things other than liberties, but Rawls doesn't seem to recognize this. If the preferences of a representative man are used to settle conflicts between liberties, how do we know that this will always rest on an appeal to "greater liberty" as Rawls seems to think? Furthermore, it is by no means clear that someone in the Original Position would always choose to trade off wealth for liberty -- even after a decent standard of living is met.