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I partially agree with Fred on this. The whole process of reflective equilibrium may be of some value if we want to make sure that we have a consistent set of moral views. I don't object to that. But it isn't clear that it gives us anything more than consistency. It tends strongly to justify what we already believe. It will never move us very far from what we already believe. What it doesn't give us is a justification for our moral views. And that's what we want, isn't it?

Jan Narveson has objected to Rawls along these lines. He thinks that Rawls tends to think of morality as if it were science. We collect data and try to form generalizations that subsume the data. But is that the right model? After all, there is a great deal of disagreement in morals. Is there really the sort of 'data' that we have in scientific work?

Narveson thinks there may be other foundations -- not metaphysics or theology but, still, something better than generalizations that merely subsume (at best) a lot of what we already believe. He makes the following interesting comment: "Generally speaking, then, the foundation of morality is the interests of those party to it, given the facts of social life. Morality is a set of requirements that will make us all better off if they are met by everyone -- and that, accordingly, are liable to the problem of defection by some who will try to take the money and run." [Narveson, p. 145]

Maybe the choice is not between mere coherence and rock solid objective morals. Maybe there is something in between these two. I think that's what Narveson is suggesting.