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I agree
with Fred that the Original Position isn't really a contract at all.
There is no possibility
of negotiation between parties. We might as well think of it
as one rational being instead of a group.
Beyond that, I'd like to make a couple of points. First of
all, I'm not sure that the Original Position should be set up
just the way Rawls sets it up. The utilitarian philosopher R.
M. Hare has criticized Rawls a lot. He believes that with a few
changes in the setup, the parties in the Original Position would
very possibly agree on some form of utilitarianism. More
specifically, Hare believes that the veil of ignorance surrounding
the Original Position does not need to exclude as much knowledge of
the world and its history as Rawls excludes. He also believes that a
more "economical" veil, one that allowed the parties to know a great
deal about the world and its history but not their own position in
that world, would not only ensure impartiality, but would also bring
them to utilitarian conclusions. In section 30 of his Theory of
Justice Rawls suggests that even he might agree.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Rawls defined the veil of ignorance as he did in order
to avoid utilitarian conclusions. He has every right to do that; but once
we realize it, I think it detracts from the force of his argument. It
becomes clear that with a somewhat different veil of ignorance we can
have impartiality but we also get principles very different from Rawls'
principles. We can't simply accept the veil of ignorance as Rawls
defines it.
Second, I'm not sure that the parties in
Rawls' Original Position -- defined the way he defines it -- would
agree on the two principles he proposes. How do we know what
they would agree to? There are people who think that they might
agree to some form of utilitarianism. For example, John
Harsanyi, who has written on economics and game theory as well
as utilitarian ethics, believes that they would choose what is sometimes called
average rule utilitarianism.
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