This takes us back to one
of our earlier questions: Are there rational methods for settling
ethical disputes? It appears that for a relativist, the answer is that sometimes there
are and sometimes there are not. The point is that rational argument does come to an end.
For the relativist, there is no 'proof' that
every rational being must accept. I would agree with Vera and the
postmodern thinkers that Kant's hope of such proof is unfulfilled.
The relativist must accept that limitation as part of the nature of ethics and ethical argument.
Maybe a little historical
note will help.
In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle remarks that we must be
satisfied with the kind of certainty that each subject allows. That
may be relevant here. We have to ask ourselves what kind of certainty
is possible in the case of moral principles.
As far as knowledge goes, it may be useful to keep in mind that we
already use different concepts of knowledge in different areas. What
counts as knowledge in biology is different from what counts as
knowledge in mathematics. If we insisted on applying the mathematical
concept of knowledge to biology, we would have no biological knowledge
at all.
Maybe this can help us when we think about morals. Maybe we need to
revise the concept of knowledge in order to apply it to morals.
In any case, from the point of view of the relativist, moral
knowledge might be thought of as the results of the approach that we
have described, based on the ideas of Rawls and Regan. I'm not saying
that Rawls and Regan are relativists. I'm saying that the relativist
could use some of their ideas and call it moral knowledge.
If we choose to revise the concept, I think the important thing is
to avoid being gratuitous. There must be a clear bridge or connection
between our idea of moral knowledge and other ideas of knowledge. That
maybe captured in the notion of "good reason to believe or
accept" certain principles and the requirements described by
Rawls and Regan come into play.
I know we can also drop the concept of ethical knowledge altogether
as professor Sidgwick suggested. But I like keeping it. I think
Aristotle may be right.
|