Most of you agree that no rule of non-interference can be deduced from ethical relativism. But you have made some good points:

• Ayesha has suggested that there are often good reasons to keep from interfering with other cultures.
• Fred has suggested that the situation is complicated and that no general rule of interference or non-interference can be justified. It depends on the specific case.
• Following Wong, John has suggested that the fact that a group considers an action to be morally wrong is itself a factor that we ought to consider when deciding whether to interfere.
• Fred has suggested that the fundamentality of the harm being done is a factor to consider.
• John has also suggested that the type of interference matters. Perhaps persuasion or creating options can be justified in cases in which coercion cannot be justified.
• Vera has suggested that the 'authenticity' of moral views should be considered. In other words, whether people come to hold certain values because of domination or free deliberation matters.

I think it is clear that the situation is much more complex than some early cultural relativists thought. Sorting out these factors would take us weeks.