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Persons | ||
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No matter how you define the concept of a person you may not be
able to settle any important moral issue connected with abortion
without further argument.
Robert Wennberg has pointed out that if we define 'person' so
that embryos and fetuses do not qualify, we can still ask whether
embryos and fetuses can have rights and (if so) what rights they
have. On the other hand, if we define 'person' so that embryos
and/or fetuses do qualify, we can still ask whether embryos and
fetuses have the same rights as infants or adult people. Finally, even if we agree that an embryo or fetus has the same rights as an adult, it is not at all clear what follows for the case of abortion. Philosopher Judith Thomson has argued that even if the fetus is a person, it does not follow that a woman is morally wrong to withhold the use of her body as support.
(One way to avoid the first two problems is to use the word 'person' to mean "a being with a serious right to life" as Tooley does.)
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