A Feminist Approach
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Harrison asks "When shall we predicate full human value to developing fetal life?" She rejects the notion that the biological facts about the embryo/fetus can fully answer this question. Instead, we should being with a recognition of "the bodily integrity of any moral agent as a foundational condition of human well-being and dignity." This "body-right" has been generally neglected and has great importance for women, especially where child bearing is concerned. The respect for fetal life, whatever its value or status, should not be assumed to automatically override this right.

The fetus, on her view, is unquestionably a form of human life. But this does not tell us when, in the continuous process of its development, we should consider it a human being. At a minimum, we should not call the fetus a human being until it has the biological basis for such high-level human functions as "self-direction" and "agency." This only occurs when it has a well developed brain structure and nervous system. She suggests the point of viability as the proper time to call the fetus a human being. (She considers any point from the end of the fourth month of pregnancy as a plausible view.)

Because of the absence of many higher functions, we should not call the fetus a "person" at any stage of pregnancy. Thus the fetus does not have an "intrinsic" right to life, but it may be "morally wise to extend such respect, de facto, to fetuses in late stages of gestation." This extension of a right to life should not be held to override the rights of the mother, however, and implies mainly that late fetuses should not be aborted without serious reasons.

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