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Harrison's position is a complex one that makes a number of distinctions
not usually found in the literature on abortion. She distinguishes
a human being from a person. She distinguishes having a right
for intrinsic reasons from extending a right for other reasons.
But the foundations of her argument are her concept of body-right,
her claim that a fully developed brain structure is necessary
before abortion requires serious justification, and her definition
of personhood in terms of higher human functions.
If you accept her overall view, you need to provide answers to
crucial questions. Why should a fully developed human brain structure,
rather than the genetic preconditions for such a structure, be
considered a crucial moral boundary? What counts as a serious justification
for abortion in late stages of pregnancy? Why should personhood
be defined in terms of higher functions that exclude the fetus
with a fully developed brain structure? This criterion excludes
infants as well, and raises the possibility that infanticide
is justified along with abortion.
If you accept Harrison's view, can you reply to these questions?
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