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According to Rawls's (sic) theory, valid principles of social justice are exclusively those that rational people would unanimously advocate under equal conditions and while trying to reach agreement among themselves about the foundational principles governing the structure of social institutions….

Let us imagine a group of rational people, each of whom is concerned, although not solely concerned, for his or her own well-being, and who have assembled to deliberate about the supreme rules governing the structure of social institutions. Let us imagine further that while deliberating about this matter, they are placed by some means or other under a "veil of ignorance" that prevents them from knowing facts that could tempt them to base their respective choices of rules on the desire to promote their own respective interests to the disadvantage of others….

The strongest point one can make in favor of such a theory is that, as a consequence of holding it, one's theoretical understanding of morality coheres with his or her firm moral convictions. Under such circumstances a condition exists which Rawls calls reflective equilibrium….

A philosophical account of fundamental rights can be established only by showing that it effects satisfactory mutual adjustment between the theoretical orientation toward morality that people find attractive and the moral judgments they make about specific matters. In essence, this entire book constitutes an attempt to show that an account of fundamental rights strongly influenced by Rawls and other major philosophers accomplishes this end with regard to views about freedom of expression.