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One might infer from the sheer bulk of work being done that rights theory is an especially healthy area within philosophical ethics. Unfortunately, a close look at the literature suggests otherwise. What one sees above all else is disarray - albeit exuberant disarray. Beyond a shared conviction among these authors that rights are crucial, all else is up for grabs. While [Robert] Nozick concludes that the only legitimate, that is rights-respecting, state is a minimal one confined essentially to protective and reparatory functions, [Ronald] Dworkin maintains that taking rights seriously is not only compatible with but, to a large extent, requires that governments undertake sweeping social welfare measures for purposes of wealth redistribution. [John] Rawls argues for the recognition of rights because they would be agreed to by hypothetical contractors choosing fundamental social structures behind a veil of ignorance. [Alan] Gewirth, however, rejects this rationale as question-begging and instead insists that a satisfactory account must strictly deduce rights from the concept of (purposive) agency.