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There are many ways to describe or define the political philosophy of liberalism. In most cases it insists upon an area within which the individual is free to do as he or she pleases. At the very least, this means that the individual is to be free from external constraints of some sort. On the other hand, what counts as a "constraint" and what kinds of constraints are to be eliminated are controversial questions.

John Locke, for example, argued that a fairly broad range of religious views should be tolerated. In his first Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) he argued that "the care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate because his power consists only in outward force; but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God."

In On Liberty (1859), J.S. Mill wrote about "the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual." He was particularly concerned about the power of government and "majorities" to hamper the individual. He argued that:

…the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.

Over 100 years later, John Rawls proposed that each of us should enjoy "an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others."

This area of sovereignty or liberty includes not only action but ideas and basic values. Liberal philosophers typically want to maximize the extent to which each individual defines his or her own good in life. Purposes, ends, values, and ultimate goals are not to be defined, except when necessary, by governments, masters, and majorities. In "Two concepts of Liberty" (1958) Isaiah Berlin characterized modern liberals in the following way:

Most modern liberals, at their most consistent, want a situation in which as many individuals as possible can realize as many of their ends as possible, without assessment of the value of these ends as such, save in so far as they may frustrate the purposes of others. They wish the frontiers between individuals or groups of men to be drawn solely with a view to preventing collisions between human purposes, all of which must be considered to be equally ultimate, uncriticizable ends in themselves.

Along similar lines, Bruce Ackerman in Social Justice in the Liberal State takes it as a fundamental rule of liberal discourse that no person or group can claim that "his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens" when arguing for a particular distribution of scarce resources. Loren Lomasky in Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community describes people as "project pursuers" who require liberty in order to carry out the projects that give continuity and meaning to their lives.

The ideal liberal state is one that preserves a wide range of free action for individuals and imposes a minimal definition of the good. The debate over hate speech raises difficult questions about how such a state should deal with 'private' parties who verbally abuse others or speak of others as inferior. What action can the liberal state take to restrict such speech and still remain liberal? Is it possible to deal with the harm done within a liberal framework? Is the liberal state faced with a dilemma in which freedom for some is incompatible with the freedom of others? These are hard questions over which reasonable people disagree.

Reference: John Locke A Letter Concerning Toleration, p. 18, J. S. Mill On Liberty, chapter 1, John Rawls A Theory of Justice, section 11. Isaiah Berlin "Two Concepts of Liberty" Section V, Bruce Ackerman Social Justice in the Liberal State, p. 11, Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community, chapter 2.