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Developing a theory of free expression requires answering several difficult questions. The first of these is "What are the general moral grounds for a right to free expression?" Along with this question there is a second: "Why protect speech that causes harm?"

At the present time, almost no one argues that government should be allowed to restrict speech simply because it has a harmful tendency or because it causes some harm to someone. If this justification were accepted, a great deal of speech could be banned. In addition, we would be involved in endless arguments about which speech is harmful. (For example, some would say that feminist speech is harmful because it undermines the traditional family. Others would argue that it is beneficial because it promotes the welfare of women. There is no agreement on this and many other issues involving claims of harm.)

It is fairly clear that speech can produce harm. In Frederick Schauer's words:

More specifically, speech clearly can and frequently does cause harm. These harms include harms to the speaker, harm to the interests and rights of individuals other than the speaker, harm to society, and harm to the governing apparatus of the state. Saying or printing something untrue (or true) about another person may damage his reputation, humiliate him, invade his privacy, offend him, or cause emotional distress. Saying something to a group of people may cause them to do something harmful to society, such as rioting or disobeying the law. Disparaging comments about my scholarship by a universally respected scholar would do me far more harm than would be done if that same person kicked me, or even broke my arm. Unfavourable reviews of a new theatrical production cause more financial damage than do most actions giving rise to legal liability.

It is not easy to say why we should tolerate harm done through speech when we would often restrict other actions that accomplish the same result. Again, as Schauer puts it: "Why, after all, should the state be disabled from acting on what are stipulated to be good reasons just because the state's action involves dealing with speech?"

It seems that in making an argument for the restriction of speech one must do more than point to some harm done by speaking. Vera, Ann, and Malik often identify harms which they believe can be attributed to hate speech. They also need to show that these harms are special in some way that would justify restriction.

Reference: Frederick Schauer Free Speech: a Philosophical Inquiry, p. 10, 8.