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As Frederick Schauer points out, we can approach the justification of a liberal policy on free speech (or a right to free speech) in at least two ways. In the first place, we can think of free speech as an instance of freedom in general. A liberal policy or a right to speak freely is then a mid-level principle that can be justified by appealing to a broader principle or liberty right. Second, we might think of free speech as an independent principle, justified in some way other than by appeal to a broader principle of liberty.

The advantage of the first approach is that mid-level principles gain plausibility and support from being embedded into a larger theory. In this case, a larger ethical theory of the good or the right containing a broad liberty right would lend plausibility and support to a free speech principle. The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires us to justify much more than free speech. We must furnish support for the broader right to liberty or the broader theory of the good. This can be a difficult task. It also implies that if anyone rejects our broader theory, they can easily reject the justification we offer for the principle of free speech.

The advantage of the second approach is that free speech becomes an independent principle. It may be accepted, along with our justification, by people who reject our broader theoretical notions. One need not be a libertarian, for example, to accept a liberal policy on free speech.

Reference: Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry, chapter 1.