Offense (Fred Speaking)
						Return To Main Path

Consider, for example, the case of old fashioned racial protocol in the south. A white man might be genuinely offended that a black woman is called "Mrs." He might be genuinely offended if a black couple is served in the restaurant where he is eating. Are his moral rights being violated? Does he have a right to have this behavior banned? I think not.

And this same argument applies to a lot of other feelings. Consider an example that involves fear rather than offense. Perhaps a southern white woman in 1960 would have been afraid because a black man entered an elevator or an office when she was alone. The fear may be genuine. Does she have a right to demand that black men stay out of the elevator or the office?

And now that you've got me started, let me mention a related phenomenon that drives me crazy. In the last ten years or so, we have often heard people stating whether they are "comfortable" with this or that. In a lot of cases, it seems that people think that comfort is a suitable criterion for what is morally right or what should be legally prohibited or what policy should be adopted be certain institutions. I think this is a complete mistake for the reasons I've already given.

Offense and fear and comfort are too subjective and variable to be used as criteria for moral rights, legal rights, or even institutional policies. I am not saying that people's feelings are unimportant, but it is not at all clear how we are to take people's feelings into account when deciding these things.

Ariadne Home	Hate Speech Bibliography	Hate Speech Home