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I have to admit that no
one will ever be able to convince everyone to
accept a single ideal. What that suggests to me
is that the ideal I put forward can't be
fundamental. It has to be proposed within a
system of legitimate government. It is
the system of government that would have
legitimacy. By "legitimate government" I mean
one that we are morally obliged to obey.
It seems to me that again and again when we
talk about extensive, complicated modern
property rights, we get pushed back to the role
of legitimate government. Modern property is its
creation. I don't see any other way to justify
it. The same is true for social ideals to be
pursued. Ultimately I don't see any other way to
select such an ideal except through a legitimate
government.
The idea is that within that system of
legitimate government different people or
different groups can propose and defend
different social ideals. Few ideals would ever
be accepted by all, but if one ideal were
adopted as the basis of policy, then that policy
would have the moral force of legitimate
government. Everyone would be obliged to follow
the policy even if they rejected the ideal on
which it was based. Of course, they could argue
against it and organize to change it.
We live in an imperfect world. Perhaps we have
to give up thinking that everyone will accept
certain ideals or that everyone will agree that
every government policy is morally justified.
Instead, we can say that some governments are
legitimate and that we have an obligation to
obey their properly adopted and promulgated laws
-- including laws on property.
If we are working within the contractualist
paradigm, then everything turns on what can be
agreed to in the initial situation. If only the
basis for legitimate government can be agreed
to, then property rights are at the next level
down i.e., they are not derived from a principle
adopted in the initial situation but are instead
determined by legitimate government. Everyone
has an obligation to abide by the rules of
property because of their source, but it would
still be possible for those who reject my ideal
to say that the laws on property are not part of
the basic principles of justice agreed to in the
initial situation. They would, of course,
advocate a change in the law on property.
But if we could go one step further and get
agreement on a basic principle governing
property in the initial situation,
then even a legitimate government would not have
the power to adopt property laws that violated
that principle. It would, of course, have the
power to adopt laws that derived from that
principle.
I think that maybe I can give you an
argument for hypothetical agreement on such a
principle governing property in the
contractualist initial situation.
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