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Lots of people have
thought that utilitarianism has problems
allowing for strong individual rights. The whole
point of having rights is that they cannot be
violated simply because the violation produces a
gain in overall utility. It doesn't matter
whether you think of utility as happiness or
welfare or satisfied preferences. I think this
criticism is correct.
But I want to point out a different problem
with utilitarianism that I think has
considerable force.
We can
construct any number of thought experiments
in which the sacrifice or torture of one
individual increases the welfare of the
majority. (Read Ursula Le Guin's short story
"The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas.")
Utilitarianism seems to allow this. Can we
accept that view as morally correct? The
same sort of thing could be said about
sacrificing one group for another, larger
group. Stalin saw himself as sacrificing a
generation of Soviet citizens in order to
hasten the economic development of the
Soviet Union. If Soviet economic development
had been highly successful, would he have
been morally right to do what he did?
The
problem is that utilitarianism tries to
maximize an aggregate of something. The
distribution of that thing doesn't matter.
For utilitarianism, people are simply
'containers' that hold some amount of
happiness or satisfaction. It's only the
total amount of happiness that matters.
I think this is the sort of thing that Rawls
had in mind when he said that utilitarianism
doesn't take seriously the distinction between
individuals. He was right. The 'containers'
don't matter, and the distribution of
happiness doesn't matter. How do we know that
the set of rules that would maximize happiness
or welfare doesn't include rules that allow the
extreme exploitation of a small minority of the
population? I don't think we do.
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