|
 At one point I
summarized some of the arguments against
utilitarianism. I think it's only fair
that someone summarize a few of the standard
arguments against modern libertarianism in
general or libertarian property rights in
particular. I'll give it a try.
- Libertarians want really strong,
natural, individual rights (including
property rights). They are not content
with John's idea that we create and
ascribe rights to people. They want
more solid foundations than that. For
example, some libertarians rely on a
version of Alan Gewirth's argument for
individual rights. Gewirth
claims that each individual must
assert that he or she has certain
rights and that we are guilty
of a formal contradiction if we deny
such rights. But
most moral philosophers disagree
with Gewirth. It seems to me
that individuals may be required to
assert that they want certain
freedoms and resources, but that's
very different from asserting that
they have a right to them. I
think the critics are right.
- Maybe the best argument for
libertarianism is the argument from
"self-ownership." I sympathize
with that argument. I really do. But
it's very difficult to see how we are
to get from self-ownership to strong
property rights, especially in natural
resources without compensation for
non-owners. (I should point out that
this issue separates
right-libertarians like Roger Pilon
from left-libertarians like Peter
Vallentyne.) Perhaps that approach
will help us generate some sort of
property rights in natural resources
as long as there are similar resources
left for others to use. But after
that? It seems to me that John is
right that those who claim strong
property rights over natural resources
have taken something away from
non-owners. And as a result, either
the property rights of the owners must
be qualified or the owners must
compensate those who have suffered a
loss.
- Many libertarians seem to regard the
individual rights they support as
virtually inviolable. And yet is seems
to me that we can construct any number
of cases in which infringing a right
is either (a) not wrong at all, or is
(b) wrong but morally permissible if
we compensate the right holder. Does
anyone really believe that it would be
wrong to take a small amount of a rich
person's property if it saved another
person's life? Judith Thomson talks
about cases like this in her
criticisms of Robert Nozick.
- On the face of it, libertarians like
Nozick are defending the
self-determination or autonomy of
individuals. But the property rights
they advocate protect only formal
self-determination as opposed to
substantive self-determination.
Substantive self-determination
requires resources, but that is
exactly what libertarian property
rights do not guarantee.
- Libertarianism seems to conflict
with some of our most firmly held
moral convictions. Most of us strongly
believe that parents have moral
obligations to their children, that
children have obligations have
obligations to their parents, that
citizens have moral obligations to
their country, and that we all have
obligations to those who are dependent
on others or less fortunate than we
are various ways. But in libertarian
theory, what is the source of these
obligations? I'm not sure libertarians
can account for them.
- If libertarianism is correct, then
virtually every effort by government
to help the poor by taxing those who
do well in the marketplace is
unjustified. I think most Americans
find that morally absurd. On this
point at least, libertarianism doesn't
coincide with strong, widely held
moral intuitions.
- When applied to everyday economic
life, libertarianism has some highly
undesirable consequences. It allows
employers to take advantage of the
poor by offering them subsistence
wages, or in some cases even less.
From the libertarian point of view,
the fact that the bargaining strength
of the poor is much less than that of
the employer is irrelevant. So too are
the devastating consequences of such a
system. Why should we regard such an
arrangement as just?
- Even if we were to grant that
certain actions can generate
libertarian property rights, we need
to recognize that nothing at all like
the libertarian scenarios justifying
initial acquisition and legitimate
transfer has taken place in our
history. Force and fraud have been the
rule, not the exception. As a result,
libertarianism can offer us no
justification for the existing
distribution of wealth. Nozick said as
much. Furthermore, if libertarians
want to claim that despite a history
of fraud and violence we should adopt
a system of libertarian property
rights today, they need to supply a
whole new argument. The fact that
labor and occupation might have
justified some sort of property rights
in a state of nature tells us nothing
about what we should do today.
- Libertarianism is most plausible for
independent adults with a full range
of normal human capacities. But what
about those who are dependent on
others? What about those who do not
have a full range of capacities? In
other words, what about children, the
disabled, and the elderly?
|
