In
particular, there are three
questions that merit further
attention. First, why should
anyone have a right to the
enjoyment of any goods at all,
and, more specifically, well-being
and freedom? Second, for what
reasons might we be warranted in
believing that the intrinsic value
of the enjoyment of such goods is
the same for all persons? And
third, even if someone ought to
have a right to well-being and
freedom and even if the intrinsic
value of each person's enjoyment
of these things is equal, why
should all men have the equal
right --and hence the human
right-- to secure, obtain, or
enjoy these goods?
I think
that the third question is the
simplest of the three to answer.
If anyone has a right to
well-being and freedom and if the
intrinsic value of any person's
enjoyment of these goods is equal
to that of any other's, then all
men do have an equal right --and
hence a human right-- to secure,
obtain, or enjoy these goods, just
because it would be irrational to
distinguish among persons as to
the possession of these rights.
That is to say, the principle that
no person should be treated
differently from any or all other
persons unless there is some
general and relevant reason that
justifies this difference in
treatment is a fundamental
principle of morality, if not of
rationality itself....
As to the
first question, that of whether a
person has a right to well-being
and freedom, I am not certain what
kind of answer is most
satisfactory. If Vlastos is
correct in asserting that these
enjoyments are values,
then that is, perhaps, answer
enough. That is to say, if
enjoying well-being is something valuable
--and especially if it is
intrinsically valuable-- then it
seems to follow that this is the
kind of thing to which one ought
to have a right. For if anything
ought to be given the kind of
protection afforded by a right, it
ought surely be that which is
valuable....
The crucial
question, then, is the
plausibility of ascribing equal
intrinsic value to each person's
well-being and freedom. There are,
I think, at least three different
answers that might be given.
First, it
might be asserted that this
ascription simply constitutes
another feature of our
morality....
[Second,]
there are cases in which all human
beings equally are
capable of enjoying the same
goods, e.g., relief from acute
physical pain, or that they are
capable of deriving equal
enjoyment from the same goods. If
this is true, then if anyone has a
right to this enjoyment, that
right is a human right just
because there is no rational
ground for preferring one man's
enjoyment to another's....
The
difficulty is simply that it does
seem extraordinarily difficult to
know how one would show that all
men are equally capable of
enjoying any of the same goods, or
even how one might attempt to
gather or evaluate relevant
evidence in this matter....
[Third,]
even if we have no meaningful or
reliable criteria for comparing
and weighing capabilities for
enjoyment or for measuring their
quantity or quality, we probably
know all we need to know to
justify our refusal to attempt to
grade the value of the enjoyment
of these goods. Hence, the dual
grounds for treating their
intrinsic values as equal for all
persons: either these values are
equal for all persons, or, if
there are differences, they are
not in principle discoverable or
measurable. Hence, the argument,
or an argument, for the human
rights to well-being and freedom.
[Richard
Wasserstrom, "Rights, Human
rights, and Racial
Discrimination," Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. 61, No.
20, p. 634-638]
There was another philosopher,
named Richard Wasserstrom, who paid close
attention to the work of Vlastos. He tried to
clarify and add detail to Vlastos's argument.
I want to give you some idea of his views: