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I want to add something on the work of Diana Meyers. I don't entirely agree with her point of view, but it is a reason based argument and I want you to think about it.

Meyers makes an argument with the following overall structure:

• An "adequate moral system" (AMS) must have certain features. It must not be self-defeating and it must not be self-rescinding.
• It follows that an adequate moral system must not require the destruction of moral agents.
  
• From the necessary features of an adequate moral system, four "inalienable" rights follow.
• The four inalienable rights are the right to "life, personal liberty, benign treatment, and satisfaction of basic needs."

Here's a quote from Meyers, just to give you a taste of her argument.

Moral systems, as we have seen, must be neither self-defeating -- they must not prescribe conduct bringing moral interaction to a halt -- nor self-rescinding -- they must not permit conduct that engenders moral relations inimical to moral interaction....In order not to be self-defeating or self-rescinding, moral systems must refrain both from obligating their adherents to relinquish goods which they need to act as moral agents and from permitting their adherents to compete for these goods on a quotidian basis. It follows that moral systems must recognize inalienable rights to those goods persons need to conduct themselves morally. [Diana Meyers, Inalienable Rights, p. 184-185.]

Now, as I said, I don't entirely accept her argument. I object to her claim that people have a right to the satisfaction of basic needs. But I do respect her attempt to avoid the pitfalls of ethical relativism and non-cognitivism. She does not attempt to base rights on our current feelings or moral sentiments. She tries to find a more solid basis for rights that does not include human feelings, preferences, and attitudes. In my view, the latter are far too variable. We all know that countless people once believed that slavery was morally acceptable. I don't want my rights to be based on anything so variable as human sentiments.