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When I refer to the classical
liberal or modern libertarian view of
property, I'm thinking of very extensive
property rights that include the right to use,
to develop, to sell, to rent, to divide, and
even to destroy a piece of property. It
definitely includes the right to exclude
others from using the same property. It also
includes the right to transfer the property to
others for a price or as a gift or
inheritance. And the person who gets the
property as a result of the transfer has just
as strong a right to it as the person from
whom he or she got it. That is what I mean
when I refer to an "extensive" property right.
It is pretty clear
historically that when John Locke (1632-1704)
discussed property in the state of nature, he
begins with a limited USE right and goes on to
justify a degree of individual control over
resources like land. But the rights he
advocates are always limited in various ways
and do not imply
the extensive range of control that classical
liberals and modern libertarians advocate. For
example, those with property are always
obligated to assist the poor out of the
surplus they have.
Locke believed that God had
originally given the earth to mankind in
common. He did not believe that the land was
simply there and that no one owned it. It was
owned in common by all. This meant that
everyone had a basic right to use the land to
live and prosper. Incidentally, I think that
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) took the view that
the earth was simply there waiting to be
occupied and owned.
You aren't going to like
this, Dee, but I believe that one useful way
to look at classic liberal and modern
libertarian property rights is that they
constitute a deviation from a larger
historical theme that insists that property
owners have significant moral obligations to
all of society. Their property is only
justified if they accept those obligations.
Let me put this differently.
Many societies around the world have
recognized that the group as a whole has a
responsibility for the welfare of the
individual. In some peasant societies, for
example, the village manages land and ensures
that each family has a piece of land to farm.
The point is that there is a kind of corporate
responsibility for the individual. In return,
of course, the individual has certain
responsibilities to the group. The classic
liberal and modern libertarian view changes
all this. It claims that the group has minimal
responsibility for the individual and, at the
same time, the individual owes less to the
group. In its most extreme forms, this view
leaves group responsibility to private
charity.
I believe that we have gone
too far in the liberal direction. Perhaps we
should reconsider the possibility that the
justification for private property includes
certain obligations to those who lack
property. Or perhaps we should consider a
greater corporate responsibility for the
welfare of each individual.
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