There
must be qualifications. I agree. And I agree that catastrophe or a
series of injustices may lead to temporary changes in the rules.
We can speak of normal and abnormal circumstances if you wish.
But I want to add that in my view, all of these qualifications
should be contained within our theory of justice. They are not
exceptions to the theory or proof that the theory is inadequate.
If we have a theory of individual rights, for example, and the
theory tells us that people have a right to private property under
certain circumstances but not others, those qualifications are all
internal to the theory of justice we are relying on.
I think this is important because I reject the notion that justice
is just one good thing that is to be weighed against the creation of
other good things. The rules of justice are not to be overridden so
that some greater good can be achieved. If there are exceptions or
limitations to the rules, they should be contained within the theory
of justice itself.
|