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I have to add a note of dissent here. I want to call into question what we're trying to do -- the basic project so to speak.

We started by talking about 'treating equal cases equally.' That led us to the problem of determining relevant considerations. And that led us to the notion of a theory of justice within which we determine which cases are equal.

All of that sounds good, but maybe it's a little too perfect. I think that the whole project is based on a model adapted from a certain idea of natural science. You want to construct a theory that will given us a list of the relevant variables and a set of generalizations that tell us the connections between the variables. Once we know the theory, we can apply it to moral problems. This is how some people think natural science and even legal systems work.

But is this really possible? I honestly don't know. Moral judgments are made in concrete situations with all of the details, the 'particularity,' the messiness of real life. Moral judgments are also situated in specific histories and moral traditions. Is it really possible to pick out the relevant variables as in physics? And is it possible to ignore the different traditions in which people live?

I guess my point is this: The kind of theory we are talking about may be a will-o'-the-wisp that we seek because we take a certain picture of physics or law as models of how knowledge or rules ought to be organized.

Maybe we need to think about morality and justice in some other way?