That's
interesting. I agree that the two people in the library are being
treated unequally. And I'm glad that the principle we are discussing
allows that people can be treated unequally and still be treated
justly.
Sometimes in our country we start with the premise that everyone
should be treated equally and then argue that for different people
equal treatment is very different. In part, we do this because our
constitution promises people "equal protection" and we all
want to argue within that framework.
For example, someone might say that handicapped people and
non-handicapped people have a right to be treated equally. Then he
could go on to say that "equal treatment" for the
handicapped person means something very different from what it means
for the person who is not handicapped.
If you take this approach, you end up saying that "equal
treatment" for the handicapped person means being provided with
an elevator while "equal treatment" for the non-handicapped
person means being provided with a stairway.
That doesn't sound so bad in the case of the library; but what
happens when we are talking about murderers and non-murderers? Do we
then say that "equal treatment" for the murderer means
incarceration while "equal treatment" for the non-murderer
means freedom? I think that stretches the ordinary meaning of the
terms beyond recognition.
I would rather say what we are saying; namely, that justice
requires, or at least allows, that different cases be treated differently.
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