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Most moral philosophers who accept some form of utilitarianism would agree that there is no 'proof' of the principle of utility that can be based on conceptual analysis or science.

R. M. Hare identified himself as a utilitarian and suggested that at least certain elements of utilitarianism are conceptual truths. In other words, certain elements of utilitarianism can be derived from the meanings and the logic of moral terms such as 'ought.'

Hare believed that our moral concepts logically bound us to accept certain universalized versions of our moral judgments. If I claimed, for example, that I ought not to be treated in certain ways, then I was logically committed to the universal statement that no one like myself in all relevant respects ought to be treated in those ways. (On the other hand, Hare also admitted that no one was required to make claims using the moral concept of 'ought.' If a person refused to make such claims, he or she was not logically bound to accept the universalized form of those claims. Someone might, for example, insist on saying only that they did not want to be treated in certain ways or that he would resist those who treated him in those ways.)

Hare offered the following argument:
I wish merely to point out that the logical character of moral language, as I have claimed it to be, is the formal foundation of any such theory [i.e., utilitarian theory]. It is in the endeavour to find lines of conduct which we can prescribe universally in a given situation that we find ourselves bound to give equal weight to the desires of all parties (the foundation of distributive justice); and this, in turn, leads to such views as that we should seek to maximize satisfactions. For if my action is going to affect the interests of a number of people, and I ask myself what course of action I can prescribe universally for people in just this situation, then what I shall have to do, in order to answer this question, is to put myself imaginatively in place of the other parties (or, if they are many, of a representative sample of them) and ask the same sort of questions as we made the creditor ask when he had imagined himself in the situation of his debtor. And the considerations that weigh with me in this inquiry can only be, How much (as I imagine myself in the place of each man in turn) do I want to have this, or to avoid that? But when I have been the round of all the affected parties, and come back, in my own person, to make an impartial moral judgment giving equal weight to the interests of all parties, what can I possibly do except advocate that course which will, taken all in all, least frustrate the desires which I have imagined myself having? But this (it is plausible to go on) is to maximize satisfactions. [R. M. Hare Freedom and Reason, p. 123, brackets added.]