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Libertarian philosophers have generally defended non-interference rights and rejected positive rights to the means necessary to do things. Jan Narveson echoes Dee's view when he writes as follows:

Why shouldn't the libertarian try to maximize positive rights to liberty, as in the version described in chapter 4 above? The answer is that there is a libertarian case against positive rights that is based on the aforementioned consideration: viz., that they violate liberty in a way that negative rights do not. If our root idea is that the individual -- any individual -- is to be allowed to do, as nearly as possible, what that individual wants with his or her life, then we have already given the ground for restricting individuals from acts preventing others from doing what the please with their lives. It would be self-contradictory to say of everyone that all may do as they please, as a matter of right, even though some may go ahead and force others to do one thing rather than another. But it is not self-contradictory to say that no one may be forced to promote anyone else's good, even if that good consists in an expansion of that other person's liberty. Not only is it not self-contradictory but the implication seems straightforward and inevitable, once we are aware that liberty and not something else is what's at stake. [Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, p. 60.]