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In his discussion of the concept of justice, Chaim Perelman emphasizes the formal nature of the rule that requires us to treat equal cases equally.

We can, then, define formal or abstract justice as a principle of action in accordance with which beings of one and the same essential category must be treated in the same way.

Be it noted at once that the definition we have just offered is of a purely formal idea, leaving untouched and entire all the differences that arise in respect of concrete justice. Our definition tells us neither when two beings participate in an essential category nor how they ought to be treated. We know that beings must be treated not in such or such a manner, but equally, so that it is impossible to say that one has been placed at a disadvantage by reference to another. We know, too, that equal treatment must be provided only for beings forming part of the same essential category....

Our definition of justice is formal for the reason that it does not lay down the categories that are essential for the administration of justice.

[Chaim Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, translated by John Petrie, p. 16-17.]