Sources & Extracts

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Let us, then, after these unfruitful attempts, take up our problem again from the very beginning. The question is to find a formula of justice which is common to the different conceptions we have analysed (sic).... The common idea will constitute a definition of formal or abstract justice. Each particular or concrete formula will constitute one of the innumerable values of formal justice.

Is it possible to define formal justice? Is there a conceptual element common to all the formulas of justice? Apparently, yes. In effect, we all agree on the fact that to be just is to treat in equal fashion. Unfortunately, difficulties and controversies arise as soon as precision is called for. Must everyone be treated in the same way, or must we draw distinctions? And if distinctions must be drawn, which ones must we take into account in administering justice? Each man puts forward a different answer to these questions. Each man advocates a different system. No system is capable of securing the adherence of all. Some say that regard must be had to the individual's merits. Others that the individual's needs must be taken into consideration. Yet others say it is impossible to disregard origin, rank, etc.

But despite all their differences, they all have something in common in their attitude. He who requires merit to be taken into account wants the same treatment for persons having equal merits. A second wants equal treatment to be provided for persons having the same needs. A third will demand just, that is, equal, treatment for persons of the same social rank and so on....

We can, then, define formal or abstract justice as a principle of action in accordance with which beings of one and the same essential category must be treated in the same way.

[Chaim Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, translated by John Petrie, p. 15-16.]