Review this excerpt and then go back to the main thread.
Most moral philosophers agree that justice requires that
equal cases be treated equally, and different should be treated differently.
They also recognize that this rule raises many problems of interpretation. The
recognition that only some situational factors are relevant to determining
justice is quickly realized and leads to new questions. Here are a few of
comments from philosophers who have written about on this aspect of justice:
In discussing justice, the Victorian Henry Sidgwick
remarks that "We must therefore conclude, that, in laying down the law
no less than in carrying it out, all inequality affecting the interests of
individuals which appears arbitrary, and for which no sufficient reason can
be given, is held to be unjust. But we have still to ask, what kind of
reasons for inequality Justice admits and from what general principle (or
principles) all such reasons are to be deduced?" [The Methods of
Ethics, seventh edition, Book III, Chapter V, p. 267-68.]
William Frankena writes that "It is a requirement
both of reason and of common thinking about justice that similar cases be
treated similarly.... Actually, of course, justice does not require that all
similarities and dissimilarities be respected in this way....[J]ustice does
not call for similar treatment of every similarity or for dissimilar
treatment of every dissimilarity. We do not think it is necessarily unjust,
even if other things are equal, to deal similarly with people of different
colors or dissimilarly with people of the same color. In fact, the
historical quest for social justice has consisted largely of attempts to
eliminate certain dissimilarities as bases for difference of treatment and
certain similarities as bases for sameness of treatment. That is, it seems
to be part of the concept of justice that not all similarities justify (or
justicize) similar treatment or all differences different treatment. The
point of the quest for social justice has not been merely that similarities
and differences in people have too often been arbitrarily ignored; it has
been mainly that the wrong similarities and differences have been taken as a
basis for action. Similarities and differences should form the basis of
action if it is to be just, but not all of them are relevant. The question
is "Which of them are just- or unjust-making? Which of them are
relevant? And is there a relation between them?" [William Frankena,
"The Concept of Social Justice" in Social Justice, ed.
Richard Brandt, p. 9-10.]
Joel Feinberg tells us that "The basic principle
of comparative justice is that like cases are to be treated alike and
different cases to be treated differently.... Any two persons or things will
differ in some respects, and it is always possible to cite some
difference between them in support (more precisely, in justicization)
of differences in the way they are treated. Clearly, then, comparative
justice requires more than that difference in treatment be based on
differences in characteristics. The underlying differences between
individuals that justicize differences in their treatment must be relevant
differences, and the underlying similarities that justicize similar
treatment must be relevant similarities." [Social Philosophy,
p. 99-100.]