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Let me jump in here and try to wrap this up. I'll try to summarize your criticisms of Rawls' theory. First, a few ideas on Rawls' overall approach:

• Vera is suspicious of Rawls' entire intellectual project. She's not at all sure that we can develop ethical laws or generalizations. The world, one might way, is too deeply particular. There are too many relevant features of situations to allow for generalizations. We are following the wrong model -- looking for something like scientific laws when there are none. She is also very uncertain about the role of impartiality, which Rawls tries to build into his Original Position.
• Ann suspects that the Original Position may have been designed to make sure the parties to it do not reach utilitarian conclusions. She thinks that from an equally plausible Original Position the parties might do just that.
• Some of you have raised the whole vexed question whether Rawls has really shown that his principles would be chosen in the Original Position.
• Dee is not sure that justice should be based on an agreement -- real or hypothetical. Ideally, she would like a deontological theory of justice. I think she mentioned the work of Alan Gewirth as an example. But she is also interested in foundations in rational prudence, like those discussed by Jan Narveson. She also claimed that the method Rawls uses in the Original Position could be used to justify all kinds of outlandish principles of justice.
• Fred also rejects the notion that morals (including justice) can be based on an agreement among people. Nor does a simple coherence argument doesn't provide the foundations he wants. After all, maybe Hitler could make a logically consistent argument for his views. He wants to get away from any reliance on changeable human attitudes. In short, he wants the solid foundations that Vera rejects so vehemently. In his view, the best foundations are theological.

In addition, you had some criticisms of Rawls' two principles:

• Dee believes that for all his rhetoric about utilitarianism not taking the difference between individuals seriously, Rawls makes a similar mistake himself. He ends up talking about our individual capacities as a communal resource because they are not deserved. She believes that people should be allowed to use their capacities to produce and exchange goods as long as those exchanges are voluntary. Simply because the result is an increase in inequality that does not benefit the least well off is irrelevant.
• Fred objects to the second principle -- the difference principle. He thinks it is irrational to object to an increase in inequality simply because it doesn't help everyone. He also thinks it is irrational to object to a large increase in inequality that benefits most people a great deal simply because it causes the poorest group to lose a tiny bit of what they have. In addition, he does not think that the second principle would pass the reflective equilibrium test. Nor does he think it could serve as a basis of a stable society. He also objected that the principles that Rawls believes to be widely shared may not be widely shared at all.
• Ann isn't convinced that people in a plausibly defined Original Position would choose Rawls' two principles. They might choose a form of utilitarianism. She also finds it odd to say, as Rawls must, that a huge benefit to most people must be disallowed if it goes along with a small loss for the least well off group. And she agrees with Fred that this view would not pass the reflective equilibrium test.

Now I think we should go on and talk about possible alternatives to Rawls' theory. It's a lot easier to criticize than to construct. I want to hear what you advocate in place of what he has offered.