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I'm not sure Young is fair to the philosophers who defend impartiality.

First of all, I think we all agree that some differences between people and cases are relevant to justice and some are not. We don't want the police or the courts to make decisions on the basis of who is black and who is white, do we?

Secondly, the philosophers who speak of impartiality do not deny that there are relevant differences between cases. They all agree that relevant differences are to be considered and may well require different treatment. It's a mistake to think that they are saying that all cases must be treated alike. They aren't trying to reduce everything to unity as Young suggests.

But once we admit these things, we are forced to ask which characteristics or which differences are morally relevant and which are not. In other words, we are forced back to the kind of theorizing that Young criticizes.

Young may reply that all of this only applies to the realm of law and public policy. Maybe so, but isn't that exactly what we are concerned about when we argue about justice?