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We often speak as though self-interest and strong feeling somehow vitiate our moral positions. Sometimes they do. But on the other hand, consider some of the most important cases of the last 50 years. The self-interest of American blacks was at stake in the civil rights movement. Does that mean that the moral positions they took -- that segregation and discrimination were wrong, for example -- are somehow distorted or unreliable? What about the women's movement of the 1970s? Does the fact that women felt strongly that it was unjust for them to be paid less than men for the same work mean that their judgment was flawed?

My point is that self-interest and passion is not always a mark of inferior, distorted, or untrustworthy moral judgments. They do not always contaminate our judgments. Self-interest may be combined with strongly felt but perfectly acceptable judgments about justice.

Look, I think there has been a large group of philosophers who have believed that partiality was wrong or at least a distorting influence on our moral judgments. To avoid that distortion, they have suggested that we try to achieve impartiality. And they have proposed various devices such as Rawls' veil of ignorance to achieve that goal. But maybe there is another way to get to the 'correct' result. Instead of trying to achieve impartiality, perhaps it would be better to begin with all the partiality that human beings have and then enter into a serious dialogue with other people with different experiences and a different set of partialities?

There are other philosophers who look at this differently. I've already mentioned Virginia Held. Another person to read is Iris Young.