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I want to recap what we've said about Rawls before we continue. 

It helps to understand what Rawls' theory is not. First, in Rawls' theory, the foundations of justice are not theological. Second, the foundations are not derived through the analysis of moral concepts. Finally, the theory is not teleological. For Rawls, the foundation of justice is a hypothetical agreement or contract of a special kind.

The contract is unusual because it is made by rational, mutually disinterested people choosing from behind a veil of ignorance. The people making the contract are also subject to various formal constraints that John mentioned. And, by the way, one of the formal constraints is that whatever principles they choose must treat equal cases equally.

Because of the veil of ignorance, the people choosing principles are unable to favor themselves. They cannot bias their choice of principles in their favor because they do not know their own personal characteristics or what their position in society will be.

In other words, for Rawls, identifying the principles of justice is reduced to rational prudence operating with limited information.

Choosing the principles of justice is a case of what Rawls calls "pure procedural justice." There is no independent criterion for the correct principles. The principles are 'correct' because they have been chosen as the result of a fair process -- in other words, because they are chosen in the original position that Rawls describes.

OK. So far, so good. But what are the principles? Let's get them on the table. John, you tell us.