John - The Original Position

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The Original Position

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John Speaking

I want to elaborate on the notion of "formal constraints" that you mentioned.

Rawls accepts the notion that there are certain standards that principles of justice must meet -- and yet these standards don't actually determine the content of the principles. This is similar to what Perelman said about formal and material justice.

Here are some of the "formal constraints on the concept of right" that Rawls recognizes:

Principles are to be general. For example, they cannot refer to particular persons.
Principles always apply.
Principles are to be universal. In other words, they must apply to everyone.
Principles cannot be self-contradictory.
Principles must be publicly known.
Principles must supply a way to order claims -- to decide what is more important in case of conflict.
Principles are to be final. They are the "final court of appeal."

Rawls summarizes his view in the following statement:

Taken together, then, these conditions on conceptions of right come to this: a conception of right is a set of principles, general in form and universal in application, that is to be publicly recognized as a final court of appeal for ordering the conflicting claims of moral persons. [Theory, section #23]


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