Related Ideas

Ronald Dworkin offers an interesting way of thinking about the overall structure of Rawls' theory. He does not believe that the original position lies at the foundations of Rawls' theory. He suggests that there is a "deeper theory" implicit in Rawls' work. 

In Dworkin's view, theories of justice are either "right-based," "goal-based," or "duty-based." In a goal-based theory, rights and duties are subordinated to and derived from goals.  In a right-based theory, goals are subordinated to rights. For example, achieving a goal may be limited because it would violate someone's rights. Dworkin believes that the deeper theory underlying Rawls' contract is right-based or "deontological." Furthermore, the right or rights involved are "natural" in that they are not the product of "legislation, or convention, or hypothetical contract."

Dworkin goes on to define the particular right that he believes lies at the foundation of Rawls' theory. Breaking with some varieties of liberalism, he denies that it is a right to liberty. Instead, he proposes that the foundation of Rawls' theory must be a right to equal "concern and respect."

Reference: See Ronald Dworkin, "The Original Position" in Reading Rawls edited by Normal Daniels.