I think that's an interesting suggestion -- and it does seem to help us deal with some difficult cases.
- Here's an example that Judith Thomson uses. How many of us would say that we must respect the property rights of someone who posted a No Trespassing sign on his property if the only way to save a child's life was to drive across the property to get to a hospital? If we agree that we should drive across the property, it is because of weighty moral concerns. It does not mean that the
property right does not exist. In this case it appears that consequences must limit our observance of property rights.
- On the other hand, we can imagine a case in which we could save a life if we could simply take an organ from another person. Most of us would object
strenuously to doing such a thing without the permission of the person with the good organ. This seems to be a case in which consequences, even though highly desirable, are trumped by a person's right to control his or her own body.
It seems that our theory of justice must somehow combine a consideration of rights and consequences; or, as you say, they must somehow limit each other.
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